Safe access to Cisco (or any router)

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Well-known member
Nov 1, 2020
On the Oct 24th Security Now podcast Steve discussed the brutal flaws in Cisco routers and switches. The bug was in the web interface and Steve said, of course, not to leave the web UI open to the Internet. But, his alternative was to " use a VPN to connect to the private network behind the router"

I don't understand what this means.

What VPN server is he suggesting that someone connect to?

A server running on the router? If so, why would you assume the VPN server software is perfect while the web UI is buggy? And a VPN server on the router also opens a port to the Internet at large. A VPN server running on an internal device? This too would open a port in the router.

In general, limiting web admin access by source IP is a great idea, but depending on the bug in the web interface, it may not offer full protection.

Many, if not most routers can be administered via a cloud service. TP-Link has a few different cloud services. Peplink has one. Asus is rare in not offering one. Using a cloud service means no holes in the router firewall as the router itself phones home to the cloud. But, it means trusting every employee of the hardware manufacturer.

You could also remotely control an internal device using a remote control system that uses the cloud to make a connection. There are many such programs. Then, from the internal device get at the LAN side of the router.

On a related note, I track router bugs ( and Cisco has a disgraceful security record. I would not use their hardware if they gave it away for free.
Um, I think it's self-evident what he meant. You put a VPN device with access to the inside of the network into the DMZ. You lock down the VPN device so that it only accepts key based authentication, so it should be impossible for an attacker to hack through it. This allows a client on the outside to connect to the VPN, authenticate, and then gain access to the inside network, which means when it connects to any device such as the Cisco router, it will be coming from the inside, and will be allowed, whereas a firewall will block any access from the outside.


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Not self-evident to me.
So, Steve's point was that rather than trust the router web UI, we should trust VPN server software running on a dedicated VPN box? There have been many attacks against these types of devices. And a system that gives admins access to the full LAN can be considered more dangerous than a system that gives bad guys access to one router.
In your diagram, the path still goes thru the router so it still has an open port, so not the safest thing.
I could argue that cloud based remote admin (RealVNC, Anydesk, TeamViewer, Amy, etc) of a cheap dedicated computer in a VLAN is a safer way to get LAN side access to the router.
And switching terminology from router to firewall confuses things as diff people use the term firewall to mean diff things.
Not trying to give you a hard time, appreciate the response.