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  • SpinRite v6.1 Release #3
    The 3rd release of SpinRite v6.1 is published and may be obtained by all SpinRite v6.0 owners at the SpinRite v6.1 Pre-Release page. (SpinRite will shortly be officially updated to v6.1 so this page will be renamed.) The primary new feature, and the reason for this release, was the discovery of memory problems in some systems that were affecting SpinRite's operation. So SpinRite now incorporates a built-in test of the system's memory. For the full story, please see this page in the "Pre-Release Announcements & Feedback" forum.
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  • BootAble – FreeDOS boot testing freeware

    To obtain direct, low-level access to a system's mass storage drives, SpinRite runs under a GRC-customized version of FreeDOS which has been modified to add compatibility with all file systems. In order to run SpinRite it must first be possible to boot FreeDOS.

    GRC's “BootAble” freeware allows anyone to easily create BIOS-bootable media in order to workout and confirm the details of getting a machine to boot FreeDOS through a BIOS. Once the means of doing that has been determined, the media created by SpinRite can be booted and run in the same way.

    The participants here, who have taken the time to share their knowledge and experience, their successes and some frustrations with booting their computers into FreeDOS, have created a valuable knowledgebase which will benefit everyone who follows.

    You may click on the image to the right to obtain your own copy of BootAble. Then use the knowledge and experience documented here to boot your computer(s) into FreeDOS. And please do not hesitate to ask questions – nowhere else can better answers be found.

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RaaS/Ransomware counter-measures




During the recent SN episode covering yet more Ransomware/RaaS, I had some thoughts as to ways to fight the bad guys. Of course this is on the basis that you may know that you could be exploited and be prepared for that eventuality and react.
  1. Have Canary Tokens on your network to be encrypted too (or encrypt them with the malware). All you need to do is send the file in their "proof that decryption can happen" phase and <bingo> you have their IP address
  2. Use a security firm to create a malware-infected file that will infect them and allow you to attack back once they decrypt and view the file
Obviously these are somewhat tongue-in-cheek as the best protection is preventive; having controls from the perimeter inwards that make the malware less likely to succeed, using temporary or separate privileged accounts and do not allow your servers access to the Internet (as a whole, if you have a DMZ then isolate the hosts in that network - or outsource certain parts of it). Separate your data from the application hosts and have 3/2/1 backups. Stopping encryption and stopping exfiltration is key.




That assumes they actually open the files they decrypt.




That assumes they actually open the files they decrypt.

And that they're opening it on vulnerable and non-virtualized system. I know if I was in that line of work, I'd be using something like Qubes OS for it.

I don't think they'd even open it though. They'd probably just send back the decrypted file without looking at it. Their top priority is the money, not so much the data itself.