RaaS/Ransomware counter-measures

  • Be sure to checkout “Tips & Tricks”
    Dear Guest Visitor → Once you register and log-in:

    This forum does not automatically send notices of new content. So if, for example, you would like to be notified by mail when Steve posts an update to his blog (or of any other specific activity anywhere else), you need to tell the system what to “Watch” for you. Please checkout the “Tips & Tricks” page for details about that... and other tips!

    /Steve.
  • Larger Font Styles
    Guest:

    Just a quick heads-up that I've implemented larger font variants of our forum's light and dark page styles. You can select the style of your choice by scrolling to the footer of any page here. This might be more comfortable (it is for me) for those with high-resolution displays where the standard fonts, while permitting a lot of text to fit on the screen, might be uncomfortably small.

    (You can permanently dismiss this notification with the “X” at the upper right.)

    /Steve.

Lob

What could possibly go wrong?
Nov 7, 2020
62
10
During the recent SN episode covering yet more Ransomware/RaaS, I had some thoughts as to ways to fight the bad guys. Of course this is on the basis that you may know that you could be exploited and be prepared for that eventuality and react.
  1. Have Canary Tokens on your network to be encrypted too (or encrypt them with the malware). All you need to do is send the file in their "proof that decryption can happen" phase and <bingo> you have their IP address
  2. Use a security firm to create a malware-infected file that will infect them and allow you to attack back once they decrypt and view the file
Obviously these are somewhat tongue-in-cheek as the best protection is preventive; having controls from the perimeter inwards that make the malware less likely to succeed, using temporary or separate privileged accounts and do not allow your servers access to the Internet (as a whole, if you have a DMZ then isolate the hosts in that network - or outsource certain parts of it). Separate your data from the application hosts and have 3/2/1 backups. Stopping encryption and stopping exfiltration is key.
 

doopy

Member
Jun 7, 2021
24
5
That assumes they actually open the files they decrypt.

And that they're opening it on vulnerable and non-virtualized system. I know if I was in that line of work, I'd be using something like Qubes OS for it.

I don't think they'd even open it though. They'd probably just send back the decrypted file without looking at it. Their top priority is the money, not so much the data itself.
 
  • Like
Reactions: miquelfire