Recently I was listening to a podcast that is focused on privacy and the former law enforcement person who is the host
made a strange claim, that GrapheneOS (which is based on Android) is a safe OS to use because it was made by activists
rather than by Google. In addition, in his opinion iOS is not safe for privacy-minded individuals.
However Android (or AOSP in this case on which GrapheneOS is based) has a huge security flaw:
In order to build AOSP, one has to run Google's script which downloads a slew of prebuilt compiler executables from their website.
This brings to mind the old exploit in which someone wrote a C compiler that, when it was compiling the Unix login.c file,
made sure to add a backdoor to the login executable. It was a proof of concept showing that you really can't trust the output
of a compiler because it could have been maliciously modified to add malware to its own output.
Given the stipulation that compiling AOSP requires running unknown binaries from Google, which is a part of
the PRISM spying operation (as is Apple), how can anyone be certain that Google is not exploiting that security hole
(downloading prebuilt executables) to compromise GrapheneOS's binaries?
made a strange claim, that GrapheneOS (which is based on Android) is a safe OS to use because it was made by activists
rather than by Google. In addition, in his opinion iOS is not safe for privacy-minded individuals.
However Android (or AOSP in this case on which GrapheneOS is based) has a huge security flaw:
In order to build AOSP, one has to run Google's script which downloads a slew of prebuilt compiler executables from their website.
This brings to mind the old exploit in which someone wrote a C compiler that, when it was compiling the Unix login.c file,
made sure to add a backdoor to the login executable. It was a proof of concept showing that you really can't trust the output
of a compiler because it could have been maliciously modified to add malware to its own output.
Given the stipulation that compiling AOSP requires running unknown binaries from Google, which is a part of
the PRISM spying operation (as is Apple), how can anyone be certain that Google is not exploiting that security hole
(downloading prebuilt executables) to compromise GrapheneOS's binaries?